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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
Case No. 930291-CA 
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. 
Whether the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's 
fees in the sum of $37,820.81 was legally sufficient under Utah 
Code Ann. §75-3-804 and timely presented to the Personal Repre-
sentative in compliance ^ith Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which 
should be reviewed for its correctness with no particular 
deference to said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR 
5 (1992) . Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions 
of law is based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Stercrer. 155 UAR 30 (1992). 
II. 
Whether the Court erred in allowing the re-redirect 
examination of Personal Representative Conder at the June 14, 
1991 hearing. 
This is an issue involving the mode and order of inter-
rogation under Rule 611, Utah Rules of Evidence, and is reviewed 
on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Holmes, 495 P. 2d 
312 (1972). 
III. 
Whether the Court erred in determining that only 
$5,000.00 instead of $11,550.00 in attorney's fees were incurred 
in prosecuting the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's 
fees in the sum of $37,820.81. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which 
should be reviewed for its correctness with no particular defer-
ence to said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5 
(1992). Any findings of facts upon which the said conclusion of 
law is based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Stercrer, 155 UAR 30 (1992) . 
IV. 
Whether the Court erred in failing to surcharge Per-
sonal Representative Conder for the interest not earned by his 
failure to deposit estate funds in an interest bearing account. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which 
should be reviewed for its correctness with no particular defer-
ence to said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5 
(1992) . Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusion of 
law is based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. State v. Sterger, 155 UAR 30 (1992). 
2 
CONSTITUTION. STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION 
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 75-3-803 and 804, 
Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ethyl Ashworth and Karen E. Husband, ex-wives of dece-
dent and the parents and natural guardians, respectively, of 
Dylon C. Husband and Lindsey Husband, filed a petition for the 
minor children and heirs of Decedent for the informal appointment 
of Jerrald D. Conder as Personal Representative and for the 
informal probate of the intestate estate of Donald Chad Husband. 
(R.2-6) After approximately three months, Ethyl Ashworth, for 
Appellant, filed a petition to remove Jerrald D. Conder as Per-
sonal Representative for, among other things, the large claim for 
attorney's fees by Conder & Wangsgard incurred by Decedent prior 
to his death. (R.23-28) A hearing on the Petition to Remove was 
held on January 15, 1991 during the course of which a Stipulation 
was entered into relating to the handling of the case thereafter 
including the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees 
incurred by Decedent prior to his death. (R.184,• 190-194) Conder 
& Wangsgard filed a Petition to Approve Claim in the sum of 
$33,248.75 for attorney's fees incurred by Decedent prior to his 
death together with interest thereon in the sum of $4,572.06 for 
a total claim of $37,820.81. (R.250-252) Appellant filed a 
Response to Petition for Attorney's Fees (R. 269-272) and a Memo-
randum and an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for 
Approval of Claim for Attorney's Fees. (R.309-332;388-394) 
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Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the 
claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees on June 14, 1991 
(R.275;936-1059) and arguments of counsel were heard on July 29, 
1991 (R.325), November 25, 1991 (R.366;1234-1406) , and on January 
21, 1992 (R.429;1307-1333) which resulted in Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 7, 1992, wherein 
Conder & Wangsgard was awarded $34,038.81 on their claim. 
(R.431-438) Co-Personal Representatives filed a Petition for 
Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution (R.439-443) togeth-
er with a Schedule of Distribution and a Stipulation for Approval 
for Final Settlement Distribution (R.444-446) to which was 
attached Exhibit A setting forth the attorney's fees of Conder & 
Wangsgard incurred during the probate of the estate. (R.447-452) 
Co-Personal Representatives also filed an Inventory and Final 
Accounting (R.456-460) and an Estate Recapitulation. (R.461-462) 
Appellant then filed a Petition to Surcharge Personal Representa-
tive Conder (R.464-479) and filed an Objection and an Amended 
Objection to the Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and 
Distribution. (R.484-488;527-528) Evidentiary hearings were 
held on June 23, 1992 (R. 611-612 ;699-887) and on July 22, 1992 
(R.628-629;1158-1223) and arguments of counsel were heard on 
August 20, 1992 (R.638;1542-1571) resulting in Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Estate Closing Order. (R.672-688) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 21, 1985 (Exh. 2, 6-14-91), Decedent 
and Jerrald D. Conder of Conder & Wangsgard, hereafter Conder, 
entered into an oral agreement whereby Conder and Wangsgard would 
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provide legal services to Decedent for $105 per hour. 
(R.967,968;1024,1025) After legal services were commenced for 
Decedent on April 21, 1985, it became obvious that Decedent could 
not pay for the legal services on a regular basis and Decedent, 
who owned a construction company, would provide construction and 
remodeling services to the Conder & Wangsgard office as payment 
for legal services rendered. (R.970,971;975, 976) 
On May 27, 1990, the date of Decedent's death, plans 
had been drawn for him to remodel the Conder & Wangsgard law 
offices which would provide cancellation of the amount incurred 
for legal services (R.970,971;975,976). The remodeling was never 
done due to the death of the Decedent. 
On the night of the funeral, Conder organized a party 
for Decedent at the Hidden Valley Country Club which cost 
$1,722.71 which Conder thought would be paid for by the estate of 
Decedent. (R.790-795; Exh. 9, 6-23-92) Conder thought so much 
of the service at the party that he left an additional $50.00 
tip. (R.792) 
On June 11, 1990, four days before he was appointed 
Personal Representative, Conder entered into an agreement with 
Richard Marshall and Andy Johnson whereby they would continue to 
work for Decedent's construction company on behalf of the estate 
for an increased salary of $700.00 per week each and one-half of 
all net profits earned until the final disposition of the busi-
ness. (Exh. 5, 6-14-91; R.971-973) 
Decedent died intestate and his heirs were two minor 
children, Appellant Dylon C. Husband, age 17, and Lindsey 
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Husband, age 9. (R.2-5) Ethyl Ashworth and Karen E. Husband, 
divorced wives of Decedent, were the parents and natural 
guardians of Dylon C. Husband and Lindsey Husband, respectively, 
and they petitioned the court on June 15, 1990 to have Conder 
informally appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Decedent. (R.2-5) 
Conder failed to disclose to Ethyl Ashworth prior to 
the execution of Renunciation of Right to Act as Personal Repre-
sentative and Waiver of Bond (R.8) and Waiver of Notice (R.9) 
that Conder & Wangsgard had a claim against the estate for 
$20,000.00 in attorney's fees. (R.910-912;1050,1051) Conder was 
informally appointed Personal Representative on June 15, 1990 
(R.12-16) and published notice to creditors, the first publica-
tion being June 22, 1990 which set September 24, 1990 as the last 
day for filing claims against the Decedent's estate. (R-17) 
Thereafter, among other things, Conder as Personal 
Representative, deposited the estate funds in the non-interest 
bearing Conder & Wangsgard Attorney Trust Account (R.898-904) 
which the trial court ordered at the hearing on January 15, 1991 
placed in a separate interest bearing account (R.933); allowed 
Decedent's girlfriend, a client of Conder's (1) to live in 
Decedent's house rent free until it was sold (R.797-801), (2) use 
Decedent's Camareo IROC-Z from the date of his death for three 
months putting 8,000 miles on the vehicle until it was turned 
over to Appellant (R. 801-804 ;840-842; Exh. 14, 6-23-92), (3) to 
keep furniture, which in all probability belonged to Decedent 
(R.804-808), to keep a raft (R.808) and various items of camping 
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equipment (R.808-809-814); and gave a naugahyde couch and a set 
of golf clubs to Decedent's brother (R.814). 
On September 25, 1990, Appellant filed a petition to 
remove Conder as Personal Representative and for an inventory and 
accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-611 based on the 
foregoing and additional claims of mismanagement contained in the 
petition (R.23-28) to which Conder filed an answer on October 10, 
1990. (R.32-44) 
Conder filed and inventory and accounting on November 
16, 1990 (R. 72-164) and on December 5, 1990 Appellant filed a 
motion requiring Conder to (1) to provide an inventory and 
accounting, P&L statements, and balance sheets on Decedent's 
construction business and (2) a schedule of claims approved but 
not paid and particularly the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for 
attorney's fees. (R.165-167) A hearing was set for December 17, 
1990 which was attended by all counsel and documents were 
delivered. (R.920,921) 
The hearing on the Petition to Remove Conder as the 
Personal Representative was held on January 15, 1991 (R.185) 
which resulted in a Stipulation between Conder and his attorney, 
the attorneys for Appellant and Lindsey Husband. (R.190-193) 
The Stipulation provided in part for the appointment of a Co-
Personal Representative along with Conder for among other things 
to approve or disapprove of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for 
attorney's fees which claim for attorney's fees had to be further 
approved by the court. (R.191) 
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On May 16, 1991, Conder and his Co-Personal Representa-
tive petitioned the court to sell Decedent's business, Chad 
Husband Construction, Inc., to Richard Marshall and Andy Johnson 
(R.199-247), which sale was approved by the trial court on June 
14, 1991. (R.273,274) The sale was made and order entered over 
the objection of Appellant's attorney "that the attorney's fees 
claimed by Conder & Wangsgard should have been paid for by con-
struction and remodeling services on the Conder & Wangsgard 
offices by Chad Husband Construction, Inc." (R.273) 
The claims of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees 
incurred by Decedent prior to his death in the sum of $33,248.75 
plus interest of $4,572.06 for a total of $37,820.81 was present-
ed to the court by the Petition of K. C. Bennett of Conder & 
Wangsgard, attorney for Personal Representative, on May 6, 1990. 
(R.250-252) Appellant filed a response to the Petition for 
Attorney's Fees. (R.269-272) 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the 
claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees on June 14, 1991 
(R.275; 936-1059) after which the trial court directed that memo-
randa by the parties be filed. 
Conder, as Personal Representative, filed a Memorandum 
in Support of Petition for Claim which is the claim of Conder & 
Wangsgard against the estate for attorney's fees incurred prior 
to Decedent's death. (R.279-308) Appellant filed a Memorandum 
and Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Approval of 
Claim for Attorney's Fees. (R.309-333;388-394) 
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A hearing was held on July 29, 1991 on the claim of 
attorney's fees by Conder & Wangsgard but was continued in order 
to obtain an expedited transcript of Conder's testimony on June 
14, 1991 and a further hearing was to be held. (R.335) 
After the transcript of Conder's testimony on June 14, 
1991 had been obtained (R. 1060-1157) , a hearing was held on 
November 25, 1991. (R.366;1234-1406) This resulted in the first 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated December 17, 
1990 approving the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for $34,038.81. 
(R.409-416) A ten percent (10%) reduction ($3,781.90) off the 
original claim for attorney's fees was allowed by the trial court 
as the contractor's (Decedent's) profit for the construction and 
remodel job to have been done at the Conder & Wangsgard offices. 
(R.396-408) 
Appellant filed a Motion for a New Trial (R.419) and a 
Motion to Make New Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
altering or amending the Order accordingly (R.420) and a Memoran-
dum in Support of the Motion. (R.421-424) Conder filed a Memo-
randum in Opposition to said motions (R.425-428) and a hearing 
held on these on January 21, 1992. (R.429;1307-1333) 
The second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order were entered on February 7, 1992 awarding Conder and 
Wangsgard $34,038.81 on its claim. (R.431-438) Co-Personal 
Representatives filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement 
and Distribution (R.439-443) together with a Schedule of Distri-
bution and a Stipulation for Approval for Final Settlement 
Distribution (R.444-446) to which was attached Exhibit A setting 
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forth the attorney's fees of Conder & Wangsgard incurred during 
the probate of the estate. (R.447-452) 
Co-Personal Representatives also filed an Inventory and 
Final Accounting (R.456-460) and an Estate Recapitulation. 
(R.461-462) Appellant then filed a Petition to Surcharge 
Personal Representative Conder (R.464-479) and filed an Objection 
and an Amended Objection to the Petition for Approval of Final 
Settlement and Distribution. (R.484-488;527-528) 
Evidentiary hearings were held on June 23, 1992 (R.611-
612;699-887) and on July 22, 1992 (R. 628-629;1158-1223) and 
arguments of counsel were heard on August 20, 1992 (R.638;1542-
1571) resulting in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Estate Closing Order. (R.672-688) 
The original Schedule of Distribution proposed the 
distribution to Conder & Wangsgard of attorney's fees and 
Personal Representative fees in the sum of $23,992.50 (R.445) 
plus $5,734.75 for paralegal fees (R.450). Appellant challenged 
the attorney's fees and Personal Representative fees on the 
grounds that $11,500.00 of these said fees were incurred in 
prosecuting the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees 
incurred by Decedent prior to his death. (R.486,487;521) 
The court finally ordered a reduction of $5,000.00 in 
attorney's fees due Conder & Wangsgard that was incurred in con-
nection with a probate of the estate that was attributable to the 
prosecution of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees 
incurred by Decedent prior to his death. (R.664;676,677) 
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Appellant's attorney filed his own claim and amended claim 
for attorney's fees (R.582-610) and was awarded $1,000.00 as 
attorney's fees and $213.60 as costs. (R.680,685) The law firm 
of Conder & Wangsgard received a total of $68,409.96 representing 
the claim, attorney's and Personal Representative fees (which 
were allowed at the same rate as attorney's fees) and paralegal 
costs out of an estate with a total value of $155,784.83. 
(R.437,438;459;683-688) 
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (R.691-692) and 
Appellee Co-Personal Representatives filed a Cross-Appeal. 
(R.696-697) Lindsey Husband, one of the heirs of decedent, filed 
a Cross-Appeal. (R.694-695) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for $37,820.81 against 
the estate for attorney's fees incurred by Decedent prior to his 
death must be (1) in writing, (2) show the basis therefor, (3) 
the name and address of the claimant, (4) the amount claimed and 
(5) must have been presented prior to September 24, 1990. 
Conder and claimant on behalf of Conder and Wangsgard 
must present a claim to Conder and Personal Representative to 
comply with the Probate Code and, moreover, must approve the 
same. It is not sufficient that Conder as Personal Representa-
tive has knowledge of the claim of his law firm—it must be 
presented. 
There was no formal claim presented but certain time 
records were "put in the file." The time records did not show 
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the full basis for the agreement between Decedent and Conder. 
The name and address of Conder & Wangsgard are not on the writ-
ings put in the "file" and the clear weight of the evidence was 
that the writings were not totaled until after September 24, 
1990. The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for the aforesaid 
attorneyfs fees was not legally sufficient and was not timely 
filed. 
POINT II 
After Conder's direct and cross-examination covered the 
issues of the legal sufficiency of the Conder & Wangsgard claim 
for attorney's fees and its timely filing and Conder further 
testified on redirect covering the reasonableness of the fee and 
a $15,000.00 credit and Appellant's attorney did not re-cross-
examine it was abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 
to allow Conder to testify on re-redirect about the same issues 
he testified to on direct and cross examination. 
POINT III 
Conder's evidence was that $3,500.00 in attorney's fees 
was incurred in presenting the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for 
the attorney's fees incurred prior to Decedent's death. Appel-
lant's evidence was that $11,550.00 was incurred in prosecuting 
the said claim. The trial court mysteriously found that $5,000 
was the correct figure. 
The clear weight of the evidence was that $11,550.00 
was incurred by Conder as Personal Representative and he should 




Conder as Personal Representative kept estate funds in 
a non-interest bearing account, thereby costing the estate 
$1,357.30 in interest accumulations. When this was called to the 
attention of the trial court, it immediately ordered the estate 
funds deposited in an interest bearing account. Conder breached 
his fiduciary duty to the estate and he should be surcharged for 
the $1,357.30 interest not earned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW THAT THE CONDER & WANGSGARD CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $37,820.81 WAS LEGALLY SUFFI-
CIENT (75-3-804) AND TIMELY FILED (75-3-803). 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (1975) provides in part as 
follows: 
75-3-803. Limitation on presentation of 
claims.—(1) All claims against a decedent's 
estate which arose before the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and 
any subdivision of it, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidat-
ed or unliquidated, founded on contract, 
tort, or other legal basis, if not barred 
earlier by other statute of limitations, are 
barred against the estate, the personal rep-
resentative, and the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) Within three months after the date of 
the first publication of notice to creditors 
if notice is given in compliance with section 
75-3-801; provided, claims barred by the 
nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile 
before the first publication for claims in 
this state are also barred in this state. 
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The case of Estate of Wlckham vs. Wickham, 670 P.2nd 
452 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) held that: 
As provided in § 15-12-803, C.R.S. 1973 (1982 
CumSupp. [78-3-803]), claims are barred un-
less presented within the time sent in a 
proper notice of creditors. 
This is the law, without exception, in all jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code. Strong Bros. 
Enters, vs. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983). 
It is submitted that this is the law in the State of 
Utah based on the former Probate Code as set forth in Jones vs. 
State Tax Comm. . 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940) at 104 P.2d 
212: 
In Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 P. 
723, 14 Ann.Cas. 926, we used this language: 
"Mere knowledge on the part of the executor 
or administration of the existence of a debt 
* * * is not sufficient to dispense with the 
necessity of presentation. * * * the defense 
that the claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations (nonclaim statute and not general 
statutes of limitation) cannot be waived by 
the executor or administrator." 
The cases of Harris v. Turner, 96 Utah 342, 
85 P. 2d 44 P. 2d 699, by implication support 
this view. There is no conflict in the Utah 
cases and our ruling that, after proper 
notice, claims must be filed against an 
estate within the time limited by statute or 
said claims are forever barred is settled and 
clear. 
A Notice to Creditors was first published on June 22, 
1990, which set September 24, 1990 as the last day for filing 
claims against Decedentfs estate. (R.17) Thus, all claims must 
be presented to Conder or his attorney or the Court on or before 
September 24, 1990. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804 (1988) provides in part as 
follows: 
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate may 
be presented as follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to 
the personal representative, or the personal 
representative's attorney of record, a writ-
ten statement of the claim indicating its 
basis, the name and address of the claimant, 
and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form pre-
scribed by rule with the clerk of the court. 
The claim is deemed presented on either the 
receipt of the written statement of claim by 
the personal representative or the personal 
representative's attorney of record, or the 
filing of the claim with the court, whichever 
occurs first. 
When the claimant and the Personal Representative are 
one and the same person, the claimant must still present a claim 
to. himself as Personal Representative. In Estate of Wickham v. 
Wickham, supra, the personal representative of the Wickham 
Estate, acting individually, prepared a claim against the estate 
for reimbursement of property taxes, funeral and last illness 
expenses and statutory allowances. The claim was in writing and 
was presented by the claimant individually to himself as Personal 
Representative of the Estate for approval. The claim was 
"allowed and approved" by the claimant acting as Personal Repre-
sentative. The trial court held that this did not constitute 
presentation of the claim under Colorado's 3-804(1) of the Uni-
form Probate Code. The Colorado Court of appeals reversed the 
trial court and held that 670 P.2d 453 as follows: 
Had the framers of the Colorado Probate Code 
intended to provide a different method for 
presentation of claims when the claimant and 
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the personal representative are one and the 
same person, they could have done so. They 
did not. As written, § 15-12-804(1), C.R.S. 
1973, provides that "a claimant ... may 
deliver ... to the personal representative a 
written statement of the claim ... The claim 
is deemed presented on ... receipt of the 
written statement of claim by the personal 
representative ..." This provision was time-
ly complied with here. Any exception for the 
"two hat" situation at issue here must be 
made by the general assembly and not the 
courts. 
In the case of Dementes v. Estate of Tallas 764 P.2d 
628 (UtahCt.App. 1988), Dementes presented a timely written claim 
against the Estate of Tallas which recited: 
'...[t]he estate of the above named decedent 
is indebted to the claimant in the amount of 
$50,000.00. Such indebtedness is based upon 
services rendered and acknowledgment by 
deceased, that the $50,000.00 is due and 
owing dated December 18, 1982.' Moreover, a 
complete copy of the memorandum, in both 
Greek and English, was attached to and incor-
porated by reference in the claim. 
The Court of Appeals held at 764 P.2nd 630: 
If a claim acquaints a personal representa-
tive with a specific amount allegedly due and 
the general nature of the obligation, the 
purpose of the statute has been satisfied. 
Here, the claim was for $50,000.00 pursuant 
to a document executed by the deceased, which 
document was appended to the claim. The 
personal representative had all the informa-
tion it needed to investigate the claim and 
decide whether to pay it, fight it, or settle 
it. (Emphasis added) 
In Quinn v. Ouinn 772 P.2nd 979 (UtahCt.App. 1989), the 
claimant presented a timely written claim against the estate for 
$650,000.00 and stated in detail the basis therefor. The Utah 
Court of Appeals ruled as follows at 772 P.2nd 981: 
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We hold that Kip's claim was sufficient for 
purposes of section 75-3-803 and section 75-
3-804(1)(a) insofar as it gave Fenton fair 
notice that the estate was facing a sizeable 
tort claim, that the basis of the $650,000 
claim was the death of Dawana at the hands of 
Fenton Glade.... 
Thus, the claim of Conger & Wangsgard against Dece-
dent's estate must (1) be in writing, (2) showing the basis 
therefor, (3) the name and address of Conger & Wangsgard, (4) the 
amount claimed, and (5) filed on or before September 24, 1990. 
Findings of Fact by the Court 
7. On June 19, 1990 Jerrald D. Conder of 
Conder & Wangsgard had in his possession the 
time records of Jerrald D. Conder, Exhibit 3, 
and Scott Wangsgard, Exhibit 1, showing the 
date of service, the service performed and 
the time required to perform the service. 
Jerrald D. Conder placed Exhibits 1 and 3 in 
the estate file of Decedent. Exhibits 1 and 
3 were not totaled at this time. (R.433) 
13. Conder & Wangsgard did not file a formal 
claim against the estate showing the name and 
address of the firm, the basis for the claim 
and the amount claimed in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-804. (R.435) 
Appellant does not dispute Findings of Fact 7 and 13 as 
they are amply supported by the record. 
9. On August 31, 1991 Jerrald D. Conder 
removed Exhibit 3 and had Exhibit 3 totaled 
by his accounting staff and placed back in 
the estate file. Exhibit 1 was not totaled. 
The last seven pages of Exhibit 12 were 
pulled from the Conder & Wangsgard files by 
Jerrald D. Conder and placed in the estate 
file. Jerrald D. Conder reviewed the files 
and was satisfied that the work had been 
performed as per the said exhibits. (R.4 34) 
Finding of Fact 9 is important in that it showed the 
totaling of Exhibits 3 and 12 prior to September 24, 1990 which 
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it is submitted is a sine qua non to the legal sufficiency of any 
claim filed against an estate under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804 
(1988) . 
Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 9 
up to and including the morning session of June 14, 1991. 
A. Conder considered the claim filed on August 31, 
1990. (R.951) 
B. Conder did not have the Conder and Wangsgard claim 
totaled on August 31, 1990 but was aware of the "general sum of 
money" "in rough form." (R.953) 
C. Conder reviewed Exhibit 1 and other records and 
probably asked "the girl" to prepare some kind of total but whet-
her she did or not he wasn't clear. He didn't know. (R.958) 
When Conder was asked about anything being totaled on August 31, 
1990 he was "not exactly" sure and didn't remember. (R.959). 
At the close of the morning session, the trial court 
summed up the evidence on the claim by saying, "There's no ques-
tion that there's no claim filed, formal claim filed, on the date 
that the last claims were to be filed. No question about it. 
Does anybody have any issues about that, formal claim as such 
being filed? Anybody have question about that?" (R. 1029) 
Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 9 
in the afternoon session of June 14, 1991. 
Conder had completed his redirect examination at the 
end of the morning session (R.1028) and Appellant had no recross 
examination (R.1030) and Conder was then allowed to testify on 
re-redirect examination over the objection of Appellant. 
(R.1031) 
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D. Conder specifically remembered giving Exhibit 3 to 
the accounting staff and the totals were entered on August 31, 
1990 and Exhibit 3 was placed back in the file, (R.1032) 
E. Conder took the last seven pages of Exhibit 12, 
which apparently had already been prepared prior to August 31, 
1990 and inserted them in the "file" along with Exhibit 3. 
(R.1033,1034) 
F. Conder knew the totals of the Conder & Wangsgard 
claim against Decedent's estate to be $33,275.00 based on these 
documents as of August 31, 190. (R.1034) 
Evidence adduced by Appellant showing Findings of Fact 9 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
(A) When Conder talked about putting the records in 
the "file" to substantiate the claim for Conder & Wangsgardfs 
claim for attorney's fees on August 31, 1990, he was referring to 
the time records, Exhibits 1 and 3, hearing of 6-14-91. (R.950; 
952;956) 
(B) No exhibits were totaled on August 31, 1990. 
(R.953) 
(C) No actual billing was ever totaled or sent to 
Appellant until after September 25, 1990, the date the Petition 
to Remove was filed. (R.956,957) 
(D) Exhibit 2, which is a typed version of Exhibit 3, 
was not prepared until after the Petition to Remove was filed on 
September 25, 1990. (R.963) 
(E) The last seven pages of Exhibit 12 which is iden-
tical in format to Exhibit 2, and is the typed version of Exhibit 
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1, was somehow in existence on August 31, 1990 and placed into 
the file. (R.1003) 
(F) The last seven pages of Exhibit 12 were not 
delivered to Appellant's attorney until December 18, 1990. 
(R.999,1000;1033) 
(G) On September 25, 1990, Appellant filed a Petition 
to remove Conder as Personal Representative for among other 
things the Decedent owed Conger & Wangsgard $20,000.00 in 
attorney's fees and had no documentation therefor. (R.2 3-28) 
(H) On October 8, 1990, Conder as Personal Representa-
tive filed an Answer to the Petition to Remove alleging among 
other things: 
Personal Representative specifically states 
that he has disclosed to numerous parties 
including Peter Guyon, Attorney for Conserva-
tor of decedent's other minor child, that 
decedent was indebted to Personal Representa-
tive 's Law Firm in the amount of approximate-
ly $20,000.00. Personal Representative at no 
time concealed or withheld any information 
from petitioner and sets forth affirmatively 
that Personal Representative does have docu-
mentation including time slips, work product 
and other evidence of the $20,000.00 debt. 
Personal Representative sets forth affirma-
tively that he has not made any arrangement 
for decedent's construction company to per-
form work at his personal home in partial 
satisfaction of the $20,000.00 debt. (empha-
sis added) (R.33) 
(I) On December 5, 1990, Appellant filed a Motion and 
Notice of Hearing to be held on December 17, 1990, which Motion 
among other things moved for an Order: 
Requiring the Personal Representative to file 
a complete schedule of all claims that have 
been approved through the present time and a 
schedule of all claims that have been 
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approved but not paid and any and all claims 
filed against the estate of Donald Chad 
Husband and particularly the claim of the 
Personal Representative and/or his law firm 
for legal services rendered prior to the 
death of the Decedent in the approximate sum 
Of $20,000.00. (R.165-167) 
(J) Conder's affidavit stated that Exhibit 3 was not 
prepared until shortly after his appointment as Personal Repre-
sentative and that Exhibit 3 was not totaled until after the 
Petition to Remove was filed on September 25, 1990. (R.383,384; 
1044-1048) 
(K) The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's 
fees allegedly presented and approved for payment on August 31, 
1990 (R.1041,1042), was not paid by Conder at this time (R.1043) 
because there was too much money involved and he felt like some-
one might want to review it. (R.1044) 
(L) On August 31, 1990, there was $67,763.09 on depos-
it in the Conder & Wangsgard trust account (Exh. 11, 6-14-91). 
After the morning session and the "ruling" of the trial 
court that no formal claim had been filed prior to September 24, 
1990, Conder resumed the stand in the afternoon session and 
changed his testimony to show the totaling of Exhibit 3 and the 
last seven pages of Exhibit 12 on August 31, 1990. He knew on 
August 31, 1990 that the total Conder & Wangsgard claim according 
to these documents was $33,275.00. 
However, in Conder's Answer to the Petition to Remove 
him as Personal Representative filed on October 10, 1990, he 
responded only as if the total claim for attorney's fees was 
$20,000.00. The Answer claimed several times that Decedent owed 
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Conder & Wangsgard $20,000.00 (Conder & Wangsgard had time slips 
and other documentation showing the $20,000.00 debt; and denied 
agreeing to the remodel of Conger's residence as payment of the 
$20,000.00 in attorney's fee.) 
Conder, as Personal Representative, with a fiduciary 
duty to the estate and to Appellant should have disclosed in his 
Answer that the claim was for $33,275.00 and had been approved 
but not paid. 
Also, if Conder had the accounting staff total Exhibit 
3 on August 31, 1990, then why didn't he give Exhibit 1, which 
was also in the file, to the accounting staff for totaling 
instead of filing the last seven pages of Exhibit 12? 
The clear weight of the evidence is that Exhibit 3 and 
the last seven pages of Exhibit 12 of the June 14, 1991 hearing 
were not totaled on August 31, 1990 and there was no totaling 
until at least after October 10, 1990. 
This is not the only flaw in the Conder & Wangsgard 
claim for attorney's fees. The only place on either Exhibit 3 or 
the last seven pages of Exhibit 12 which show a basis for the 
claim is page two of Exhibit 3 where there is a notation, "$105 
per hr. per JDC." Conder directed "someone" to put this on 
Exhibit 3 which was not prepared until after June 19, 1990 or 
totaled until after September 25, 1990 but he doesn't remember 
when it was done. (R.383,384;967,968) There is not one 
scintilla or iota of evidence to support Finding of Fact No. 8 
(R.434) and it is against the clear weight of the evidence. The 
$105 per hour is not the only basis for the claim. A modifica-
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tion was made whereby the fee was to be paid by construction and 
remodeling services on the Conder & Wangsgard law office and this 
does not appear either on Exhibit 3 or the last seven pages of 
Exhibit 12• 
Exhibit 3 and the last seven pages of Exhibits 12 also 
failed to have the name and address of Conder & Wangsgard as 
further required by 75-3-804(1). Conclusions of Law 2 and 3 
(R.435,436) are primarily based on Findings of Fact No. 9, which 
has been shown, it is submitted, is against the clear weight of 
the evidence. The Conclusion of Law based on Findings of Fact 9 
must also fall and the order awarding Conder & Wangsgard must 
also fall. The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees 
incurred by Decedent prior to his death is not legally sufficient 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804 nor timely filed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-803 and the order awarding Conder & Wangsgard 
$34,038.81 should be reversed. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AT THE JUNE 14, 1991 HEARING. 
At the hearing on June 14, 1993 Conder testified on his 
direct and cross-examination generally about the sufficiency and 
timeliness of the filing of the claim of Conder & Wangsgard against 
the Estate for $37,820.81. (R. 949-1010) 
Co-personal Representative was then called to testify 
generally as to the reasonableness of the fees and an alleged 
credit in the sum of $15,000.00. (R. 1010-1019) 
Conder7s attorney then proceeded with redirect 
examination of Conder covering the reasonableness of the fees 
claimed and the $15,000.00 credit that had been brought up in the 
direct examination of the Co-personal Representative. (R. 1021-
1028) Conder's attorney concluded his direct, cross-examination 
and redirect examination by saying, "Submit it, your Honor." (R. 
1028) 
The trial court then ruled at (R. 1029): 
The Court: There's no question that there was 
no claim filed, formal claim filed, on the 
date that the last claims were to be filed. 
No question about it. 
Does anybody have any issue about that, formal 
claim as such being filed? Anybody have any 
question about that? 
Mr. Abies: No. 
The Court: Okay. You may be excused. 
(Noon recess taken.) 
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P.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
The Court: Mr. Conder, you may resume the 
stand. 
Mr. Abies, you can proceed with your cross-
examination. 
Mr. Abies: No questions. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Abies: No cross. 
The Court: You may call your next witness. 
Mr. Bennett: You Honor, that's the only 
witness we have. 
The Court: Okay. So, you may step down. 
The witness: May I speak with counsel for a 
moment ? 
The Court: You may. 
Mr. Bennett: May I see Exhibits 3 and 4. 
Mr. Abies: You Honor, I object to any further 
examination. There were no questions asked. 
There's no basis for him to redirect. 
The Court: Well, I'll allow it. 
Mr. Abies: Your Honor, I object. 
The Court: You may object, but I'll got ahead 
and allow it. 
The trial court then allowed Conder to testify on re-
redirect covering the sufficiency and timeliness of filing of the 
claim by Conder & Wangsgard for fees (R. 1030-1034) which had 
already been covered in his direct and cross-examination. At the 
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conclusion of Conder's re-redirect examination, the following 
occurred at (R. 1034): 
Mr. Bennett: That's all, your Honor. 
The Court: Mr. Abies. 
Mr. Abies: I object to that again and move to 
strike. He's just trying to correct his 
testimony. 
The Court: He has the right to do that on 
redirect. 
Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows: 
(a) Control by court. The court shall 
exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for 
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid 
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment. 
There are no Utah cases decided under this Rule of 
Evidence relating to redirect or re-redirect examination, but there 
are older Utah cases in point. 
In State v Cooper, 201 P.2d 764 (1949) the Utah Supreme 
Court states as follows at 201 P.2d 768: 
The real issue before us is whether the 
testimony was properly admitted to rebut the 
inference raised on cross-examination. It 
involves simply the question of the extent to 
which counsel may be permitted to go in 
redirect examination. It is the general rule, 
of course, that the scope of redirect 
examination is limited to the field covered in 
cross-examination. As a general rule any 
evidence logically tending to rebut the 
inferences raised in cross-examination is 
admissible. 
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The case of State v Holmes, 495 P.2d 312 (1972) held 
that, "....admission of testimony on redirect examination 
ordinarily is within the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Conder's testimony on direct and cross-examination was 
extensive and addressed the issues of the sufficiency of the claim 
and the timeliness of filing in considerable detail. The Court 
concluded and made a ruling at the conclusion of the morning 
session which was part of Finding of Fact 13 (R. 435) that there 
was no formal claim filed. (R. 1029) 
Appellant's attorney did not recross-examine Conder on 
the issue of the reasonableness of the fees or the $15,000.00 
credit allegedly received. It is submitted that this would have 
been the limited of any recross-examination by Appellant's 
attorney. 
Nevertheless, the trial court over the objection and 
motion to strike by Appellant's attorney allowed Conder to change 
his testimony on Exhibit 3 and the last seven pages of Exhibit 12 
to show they had been totaled on August 31, 1990. 
This is a clear abuse of discretion and a violation of 
Rule 611(a)(1) and (2) in that it allowed Conder to change his 
testimony after the court's ruling and was a needless waste of 
time. 
The case of Seaton v Wyo. Highway Com'n. Dist. 1, 784 
P. 2d 197 (1989) is in point. Seaton was examined on direct, cross-
examination, redirect examination and recross-examination. 
Seaton's attorney then tried to have Seaton testify on re-redirect 
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examination in order "to correct the misleading impression created 
during cross-examination (emphasis added) that Riekens needed to 
move three feet to avoid the curb." The trial court would not 
allow the re-redirect examination and Seaton appealed on the 
grounds the trial court abused its discretion. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled as follows at 784 P. 2d 
202: 
The usual function of redirect examination is 
to allow a party to explain testimony elicited 
by an adversary's cross-examination, (citing 
case)...Furthermore, W.R.E. 611(a) (U.R.E. 
611(a) requires the trial court to exercise 
reasonable control over the presentation of 
evidence to avoid needless consumption of time 
and to maintain efficiency and order in the 
proceedings. In conjunction with W.R.E. 403 
(U.R.E. 403), which permits the court to 
exclude evidence for reasons of undue delay or 
waste of time, or because the evidence is 
cumulative or might confuse the jury, W.R.E. 
611(a) vests the trial court with considerable 
discretion. (citing case) . . .A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion with respect to 
a decision concerning the manner of examining 
witnesses if that decision was reasonable; 
that is, if the trial court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. (citing case)...Nor were 
any new issues raised as to which she was 
denied the opportunity for response....Even in 
the second round, redirect examination is 
discretionary, (citing authority) The unusual 
circumstance where re-redirect examination 
could be justified or even required within the 
exercise of discretion by the trial court is 
not presented here. 
There was no recross-examination of Conder and his 
redirect had been limited to reasonableness of the fees and the 
$15,000.00 credit. 
To allow him to testify on the sufficiency of the claim 
and the timeliness of its filing was an abuse of discretion and a 
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violation of the spirit and meaning of Rules 403 and 611, Utah 
Rules of Evidence and the testimony of Conder on re-redirect 
examination should be stricken and Point I of Appellant's argument 
modified accordingly. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT ONLY $5,000.00 
INSTEAD OF $11,550.00 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE INCURRED IN 
PROSECUTING THE CLAIM OF CONDER & WANGSGARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
THE SUM OF $37,820.81. 
Findings of Fact 10, 11 and 12 and Conclusion of Law 5 
deal with the amount of attorney's fees Conder & Wangsgard claimed 
as part of the administration of the Estate in prosecuting their 
own claim for $37,820.81. (R. 676, 677; 680) 
Finding of Fact 11 contains the factual finding that 
Appellant objects to. Finding of Fact 11 provides: 
11. The personal representatives and estate 
incurred attorney's fees in the sum of 
$5,000.00 in defending the recommendation of 
the personal representatives that these fees 
be paid. (R. 676) 
Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 11. 
A. Conder filed an affidavit stating that the 
total attorney's fees charged to the estate attributable to the 
prosection of the claim for attorney's fees owed Conder & Wangsgard 
as approximately $3,500.00. (R. 622) 
B. No testimony was adduced as to the amount of 
the Conder & Wangsgard estate fees attributable to the claim for 
attorney's fees incurred prior to Decedent's death. 
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Evidence adduced by Appellant that Finding of Fact 11 is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
(A) Appellant filed and argued memoranda and 
documentation to the trial court at the hearing on August 20, 1992 
(R. 1548) relating to Appellant's attorney's claim for attorney's 
fees and the amount of time Appellant's attorneys spent defending 
against the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees (R. 582-
594) showing 95.3 hours (R. 1548). 
(B) Conder & Wangsgard spent a total of 110 hours 
at $105.00 an hour or a total of $11,550.00 which was charged 
against the estate for prosecuting their claim of $37,820.81. 
(Exhibit 1 and 2, 8-20-92; R. 649-663; 1548-1549; 1564-1565) 
(C) Appendix III sets for the date, service and 
time involved in Appellant's attorney opposing the claim of Conder 
& Wangsgard for attorney's fees. 
(D) Appendix IV sets forth the date, service and 
time involved for the four attorneys of Conder & Wangsgard who 
prosecuted their claim for attorney's fees. 
(E) Appendix IV is tied to the docket of the case. 
(R. 656) 
(F) The Conder & Wangsgard time is totaled and 
extending showing 110 hours at $150.00 per hour or a total of 
$11,550.00 incurred in prosecuting the claim for $37,820.81. (R. 
657) 
On September 24, 1992 the court made a minute entry 
relating to these fees and ruled, "The court has concluded from the 
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examination of records, affidavits, and from hearing testimony, 
that the firm of Conder & Wangsgard had charged the estate 
$5,000.00 for fees, which were not chargeable for the probate of 
the Chad Husband Estate." (R. 664) 
This was the basis for Finding of Fact 11 and there is no 
clue as to the mental or reasoning process the trial court went 
through in making its determination that $5,000.00 should be 
deducted when a range was presented of $3,500.00 to $11,550.00. 
This finding is against the clear weight of the evidence 
which is amply shown by Appendices III and IV, and (R. 656, 657). 
Conder as personal representative should be surcharged 
$6,550.00 for fees improperly incurred and paid by the Estate. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SURCHARGE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE CONDER FOR THE INTEREST NOT EARNED BY HIS FAILURE TO 
DEPOSIT ESTATE FUNDS IN AN INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT. 
Finding of Fact 20 supporting the Estate Closing Order 
found as follows: 
20. In conjunction with the administration of 
the estate, between May 24, 1990 and January 
17, 1991, personal representative caused funds 
of the estate to be placed in a non-interest 
bearing account. Thereafter, by Court order, 
the funds were deposited in an account bearing 
interest at the rate of 5.25% per annum. (R. 
678) 
Finding of Fact 21 found as follows: 
21. The deposits into trust by the personal 
representative between the date of May 24, 
1990 and January 17, 1991, was consistent with 
personal representative's duties toward the 
estate and a fair and reasonable disposition 
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of those funds. It was not necessary to 
deposit these funds in an interest bearing 
account. (R. 678) 
Finding of Fact 21 is actually a Conclusion of Law in 
that Conder fulfilled his duty to the estate by depositing the 
estate funds in a non-interest bearing account. It should be noted 
that there was no conclusion of Law relating to this issue. (R. 
679-681) 
Conder as personal representative of decedent's estate 
had a fiduciary duty as set forth in Utah code Ann. §75-3-703 which 
provides as follows: 
(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary 
who has observe the standard of care 
applicable to trustees as described by § 75-7-
302. A personal representative is under a 
duty to settle and distribute the estate of 
the decedent in accordance with the terms of 
any probated and effective will and this code 
and as expeditiously and efficiently as is 
consistent with the best interests of the 
estate. He shall use the authority conferred 
upon him by this code, the terms of the will, 
if any, and any order in proceedings to which 
he is party for the best interests of the 
successors to the estate. (emphasis added) 
The actual fiduciary duty is described in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-302 as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of 
the trust, the trustee shall observe the 
standards in dealing with the trust assets 
that would be observed by a prudent man 
dealing with the property of another, and if 
the trustee has special skills or is named 
trustee on the basis of representations of 
special skills or expertise, he is under a 
duty to use those skills. (emphasis added) 
Thus, Conder as personal representative is supposed to 
deal with the assets of the estate in the same manner as would be 
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observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another. 
It is seriously doubted that a prudent man holding funds 
for another in the approximate sum $67,000.00 would leave it in a 
non-interest account when it could be put in an account drawing 
5.25% interest. Conder's failure to do this was a breach of his 
fiduciary duty and not in the best interest of the estate as set 
forth above. 
This cost the estate the sum of $1,337.30 (Exhibit 11, 6-
23-92) until the trial court, without any argument or objection 
from Conder, ordered the immediate placement of estate funds in an 
interest bearing account. (R. 903, 904; 796-798) 
In In Re. Listman's Estate, 197 P. 596 (1921) the Supreme 
Court ruled at 197 P. 602: 
The general rule, however, is that interest is 
not chargeable, as a matter of course, against 
an executor, but may be so charged if the 
circumstances of a particular case require it. 
To the same effect see In Re. Raleigh7s Estate, 158 P. 705 (1915). 
The Listman case was decided in the days of bank failures 
where there was no FDIC or other agency or means to protect 
depositors. There was also no probate code imposing a fiduciary 
duty to do what is in the "best interest of the estate" and 
defining the fiduciary duty insofar as dealing with the property of 
the estate as a prudent man dealing with the property of another. 
Moreover, Conder is liable to the estate for the interest 
accrued from May 27, 1990 until the estate funds were deposited in 
the interest bearing account based on the Utah Uniform Revised 
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Principal and Income Act, Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-1 et seg. at 22-3-
6(2) (b) . 
This issue is of significant public interest and should 
be decided by the Court as a guide to personal representatives, 
bench and bar. 
Conder should be surcharged $1,337.30. 
CONCLUSION 
The award of $34,038.81 made to Conder & Wangsgard for 
their claim should be reversed. Personal Representative Conder 
should be surcharged $6,550.00 for improper attorney's fees and 
$1,337.30 for interest not earned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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APPENDIX I 
Wendell P. Abies, #11 -• -„,.;,..,
 : . ,, -
Attorney for Dylan Husband 
536 East 400 South
 r C D 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 "CO U , 
Telephone: (801) 532-7424 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
21 "7 acq 
ORDER „ . . .__ 
Cl/Vr 
Probate No. 903900669 ES 
In The Matter of the Estate 
of 
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND 
Deceased. 
The Petition of Jerrald D. Conder, Personal Represen-
tative of the Estate of Donald Chad Husband, for approval of a 
payment of attorney's fees to Conder & Wangsgard was heard by the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge, on June 14, 1991, the 
Personal Representative appearing and being represented by his 
attorney, K.C. Bennett, and Objector Ethel Ashworth and Dylan 
Husband, an heir, appearing and being represented by their 
attorney, Wendell P. Abies and Karen Husband, Conservator for 
Lindsay Husband, an heir of Decedent, being represented by her 
attorney Peter W. Guyon and the court having heard the testimony 
of the witnesses and having received the exhibits into evidence, 
and having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and 
having heard the arguments of counsel and after consideration and 
review of the foregoing and having made a ruling from bench on 
December 4, 1991 and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law; 
00C537 
WHEREFORE, it it hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Personal Representative is authorized to pay the 
claim of Conder & Wangsgard in the sum of $34,038.81* 
2. The defenses raised by Objector Ethel Ashworth of the 
Statute of Limitations, the new claim limitation set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-803(2)(b), breach of contract, waiver, forfeiture, 
failure of consideration, conflict of interest, breach of fiduciary 
duty and statute of frauds are without merit and are hereby denied. 
Dated this li^day of Zamza&f-, 1992. 
s[fJ— A GJLJL 
J0H& A. ROKICH 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 /-)T"day of January, 1992, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to K.C. Bennett, Attorney for Personal Representative, 
4059 South 4000 West, West Valley City, Utah 84120-4099. 
2 
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APPENDIX I I 
FftiO DISTRICT COURT 
TNrdJwflcWDisW 
Scott Ross Wangsgard #3376 
Of and for CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Personal Representatives 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 1 
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND, 
Deceased. 1 
i ESTATE CLOSING ORDER 
I Probate No. 903900669 ES 
i Judge John A. Rokich 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Approval of Final 
Settlement and Distribution filed by Jerrald D. Conder and John 
Spencer Snow dated April 6, 1992, and the Petition to Surcharge 
the Personal Representative, M l Objections Wt Amended Objections 
to Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution, 
having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and having considered the Supplement to Inventory and Final 
Accounting filed by the Personal Representative, the Court 
determines and finds that all required notices have been given or 
waived and the estate has been administered according to the laws 
of this state and the orders of this Court and should be closed. 
THEREFORE, 
0 0 0 6 8 3 
sy-
OCT 19 032 
S/WUKfcCUOw 
1. The final account of the personal representatives is 
hereby approved; the personal representatives are hereby au-
thorized and directed to deliver and distribute title and pos-
session of the assets of the estate to the distributees in the 
amount and the manner set forth in the annexed Schedule of Dis-
tribution; upon making such delivery and distribution, and duly 
filing receipts with this Court, the personal representatives 
shall be fully and finally released and discharged from their 
trust, and together with any surety, shall be released and dis-
charged from any bond and any and all liability arising in con-
nection with the performance of their duties as personal represen-
tatives; and the administration of this estate shall be closed. 
2. The decedent died intestate. The heirs of the decedent 
and their respective interests in the decedent's estate are set 
forth in the attached Determination of Heirship. 
DATED this /f day of Oc^cb *S , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Wendell Abies 
A. ROKICH 
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1988 Camaro $12,500.00 
debt ($ 8,559.71) 
net 
misc items of personalty 
1950 Harley Davidson 
Cash 
i Hidden Valley wake 



























Atty. fees/PR fees due Conder & Wangsgard * 
PR fees due John S. Snow 
Atty. fees & costs awarded Wendell Abies 
Karen/Lindsay Husband support claim 








T o t a l $ 6 3 , 7 9 6 . 9 7 
0U0655 
Misc items including tools, furnishings, sports 
equipment held in storage: 
Lindsay Husband 1/2 undivided 
interest 
Dylon Husband 1/2 undivided 
interest 
* This amount is equal to the billings of Conder & Wangsgard 
less a $5,000,00 deduction ordered regarding the claim of prior 
attorney's fees due Conder & Wangsgard less $886.10 representing \ 
of the cost of decedent's wake held at Hidden Valley Country Club. 
** Personal Representative and attorney's fees for drafting of 
closing documents, misc. estate expenses, e.g. billings for 
storage, will be paid from this amount; income by way of interest 
accumulations and any remaining sums will be divided equally 
between Dylon and Lindsay Husband. 
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APPENDIX III 
APPENDIX III 
Date Service Time 
(R. 587) 
03-08-91 Travel to West Valley City Building 
Permits Department. Travel to the Salt 
Lake County Building Permits Department. 
Assessment made to see if construction 
performed on Conder & Wangsgard office. 
Telephone to Bob Maxfield regarding the 
12-31-90 financial condition of Chad 
Husband Construction. 2.0 
(R. 588) 
05-06-91 Preparation and dictation of Abies 
Affidavit. Travel to court to get orders 
from the court. Preparation and 
dictation of Objections to Hearing on May 
9, 1991 and FAXED notice to attorneys and 
travel to court to file. 2.0 
05-06-91 Research and dictation of the balance of 
the Dylan Husband Affidavit, Ethel 
Ashworth Affidavit and Objection to 
Hearing. 1.2 
05-07-91 Preparation and dictation of the balance 
of the Abies Affidavit. 1.5 
05-07-91 Telephone to Dylan Husband. Telephone to 
K.C. Bennett. Telephone to Melba. Proof 
the deposition notes and rough in 
argument. 1.0 
(R. 589) 
05-08-91 Telephone to Ethel Ashworth and Dylan. 
Preparation of affidavits, preparation 
and dictation of Request for Production 
of Documents and Objections and send the 
same. Travel to court. Telephone to 
Melba. Conference with Dylan and Ethel 
and telephone conference with Melba 
regarding hearing in June. 1.6 
05-09-91 Telephone conference with John Spencer 
Snow and with Kirk Bennett. Telephone 
conference with Melba. Telephone 
conference with K.C. Bennett and John 
Spencer Snow and left message for John 
Spencer Snow. Preparation and dictation 
of notice of hearing. Telephone to 
Guyon. Telephone to John Spencer Snow 
and travel to Guyon's office to deliver 
papers. 
1.4 
05-10-91 Prepare for conference call. Conference 
call between Judge, K.C. Bennett, Abies, 
Guyon and possibly Conder. Preparation 
and dictation of Notice and preparation 
of Order. Travel to Conder office and 
conference with Kirk Bennett. Telephone 
conference with Kirk Bennett regarding 
Wangsgard time slips. Telephone to 
2.3 
05-15-91 Preparation and dictation of Objections 
and FAX to parties. .4 
05-16-91 Preparation for hearing and preparation 
of exhibits. Travel to court, appearance 
in chambers, telephone to reporter and 
telephone to Conder's secretary. 2.0 
05-17-91 Telephone to Linda, telephone to Wendy 
and preparation and dictation of Notice 
of Deposition. .4 
05-20-91 Preparation for deposition and second 
deposition of Conder. 3.0 
05-21-91 Telephone conference with Kirk Bennett 
and Kathy Schultz. Research on law at U 
law library. Research on law in office. 
Preparation and dictation of objections 
to the payment of attorney's fees to 
Conder & Wangsgard. 2.0 
(R. 590) 
05-22-91 Telephone conference with Peter Guyon, he 
remembers the delivery of the claim of 
fees to me on December 17, 1990. There 
was no mention of Wangsgard fees for 
$10,000. .3 
05-23-91 Preparation and dictation of Response and 
correction to Order. 2.0 
05-24-91 Subpoena for Conder. Prepare Subpoena 
for Marshall. .4 
06-05-91 Telephone conference with Joe Rhodes, a 
licensed contractor and a licensed 
engineer, $700 per week and one-half of 
net profit, excessive. Telephone call 
from K.C. Bennett. Preparation and 
dictation of Subpoenas. .7 
06-10-91 Assemble Subpoenas, travel to court to 
have delivered to constable for service. .5 
06-11-91 Research on law and cases of statutory-
provisions and go through file and 
separate and prepare for trial. 2.0 
06-12-91 Travel to law library and research. 
Travel to Secretary of State for writ and 
proprietorship information. 2.0 
06-12-91 Travel to Secretary of State's office to 
do research on the law. 2.5 
06-13-91 Research and preparation for trial, 
telephone conference with K.C. Bennett. 8.0 
06-14-91 Preparation for trial, conference with 
clients and presentation of trial, 
research and conclusion of trial. 8.7 
07-01-91 Preparation and dictation of letter and 
hand deliver the same. .4 
07-11-91 Travel to court to get copies of exhibits 
and dates from the record. .6 
(R. 591) 
07-12-91 Research, preparation and dictation of 
facts and into Point I of brief. 3.5 
07-12-91 Travel to court, research, preparation 
and dictation of the balance of Point I 
of brief and read deposition. 1.0 
07-14-91 Research and hand draft the entire 
memorandum after the factual statement. 10.0 
07-15-91 Preparation and dictation of brief on 
machine. Mailed to counsel. 2.0 
07-29-91 Preparation, travel and appearance before 
the court. Hearing held from 11:05 to 
11:30 and hearing stopped by the court. 
Transcript of Conder's testimony to be 
prepared by reporter. 2.5 
11-14-91 Telephone conference with Kirk Bennett. 
Preparation and dictation of Objection. .5 
11-21-91 Review the deposition in detail. Only 
consists of the AM testimony. Telephone 
conference with Kathy Schultz and she 
said she would check. Telephone to Kathy 
Schultz, she will do the current project 
and pull up the Conder testimony and if 
it is short, she will complete it. 
22-91 Telephone call from Kathy Schultz is 
getting the transcript ready and will 
call me. 
24-91 Review the deposition in its entirety. 
Travel to obtain a second copy. Continue 
on the deposition. 
25-91 Check deposition and preparation of 
memorandums based on the deposition. 
25-91 Preparation for hearing, research, a 
conference with clients and attendance at 
hearing before the court. 
592) 
26-91 Check depositions and transcript for 
reference to exhibits therein. 
Preparation and dictation of letter to 
Judge Rokich and delivered to Judge and 
FAXED to Conder and Snow. 
04-91 Travel to court for hearing and back to 
office. 
10-91 Check Conder Affidavit and telephone to 
several contractors. Telephone with 
Hogan, Brubaker, Lee and Bowmann. 
Preparation and dictation of 
documentation. 
12-91 Telephone calls to the various affiants, 
preparation and dictation of three 
affidavits and letter to Judge and 
deliver letters and affidavits to court. 
13-91 Preparation and dictation of letter. 
16-91 Make copies of affidavits and travel to 
court for Judge Rokich's box. Mail to 
Conder. 
27-91 Preparation and dictation of Notices, 
memo and travel to court to file and mail 
for service. 
15-92 Conference with Ethel Ashworth, Steve 
Ashworth and Dylan Husband regarding the 
problem of the attorney's fees and the 
surcharge and the final accounting. 
01-17-92 Preparation for hearing and travel to 
court and wait for small conference with 
Judge Rokich. 1.5 
01-21-92 Research and preparation for hearing, 
travel to court. Court orders to file, 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order. 1.8 
01-31-92 Preparation and dictation of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law by Abies. 2.0 
APPENDIX IV 
APPENDIX IV 
Date Service Time 
(R. 651) Conder 
02-23-91 t/c w/Rick Cuatto re: Abies Phone call 
re: attorney's fees .25 
05-20-91 Deposition of Jerry Conder 1.0 
06-06-91 Review motion re: Wendell; meet with Kirk .75 
06-13-91 Prepare for hearing 1.5 
06-14-91 Trial Time 6.0 
11-25-91 Hearing 5.0 
12-5-91 Conference w/KCB 1.0 
(R. 652) Wangsgard 
06-11-91 Prepare documents for hearing; court K.B. 
and Marshall 1.5 
06-13-91 Draft Affidavit .5 
12-06-91 Draft Findings of Fact & Conclusions of 
Law; conference w/P.R. 2.0 
(R. 653) Bennett 
05-09-91 Hearing, t/c w/Opposing counsel; review 
documents 1.75 
05-10-91 Prepare Documents; Review Documents; 
legal research; phone conference 3.0 
05-15-91 Phone Conference; preparation for 
hearing; t/c w/counsel 3.0 
05-16-91 Hearing & Travel 2.5 
05-17-91 Prepare Order; phone conference 1.75 
06-06-91 Prepare for hearing & prepare affidavits 4.0 
06-07-91 Prepare documents; prepare hearing 2.5 
06-10-91 Review documents; prepare hearing .5 
06-11-91 Prepare documents for hearing; office 
conference w/witness 2.0 
06-12-91 Deliver documents; prepare hearing 3.0 
06-13-91 Prepare for hearing; legal research 
prepare documents 5.0 
06-14-91 Trial 6.0 
06-17-91 Legal Research 3.0 
06-18-91 Legal Research 2.0 
06-20-91 Legal Research 1.0 
06-21-91 Legal Research 2.5 
06-22-91 Legal Research & Draft Memorandum 1.0 
06-22-91 Legal Research & Draft Documents 2.0 
06-24-91 Legal Research 3.0 
(R. 654) 
07-23-91 Draft Findings 1,0 
07-25-91 Legal Research 1.0 
07-26-91 Prepare findings & Legal Research 1.0 
07-29-91 Prepare for hearing 3.5 
11-12-91 Review Transcript 2.5 
01-06-92 Review & draft response 1.0 
01-19-92 Travel & conf w/Judge 2.0 
01-21-92 Travel & conference & Hearing 2.5 
(R. 654) Rognlie 
06-19-91 Research at Library 1.0 
06-28-91 Edit and proofread memorandum re: claim 
for attorney's fees 2.0 
(R. 655) 
01-03-92 Research 
.25 
